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Comments
The Deductibility of Punitive Damages
as an Ordinary and Necessary Business
Expense: Reviving the Public Policy
Doctrine
Under the judicially created public policy doctrine, the deductibil-
ity as a business expense of a payment imposed for a statutory
violation turned on whether the payment was penal,' or whether it
was compensatory. If penal, it was nondeductible, but if compen-
satory, it was deductible. Congress codified this judicial result in
1969. This Comment argues that Congress should have also codi-
fied this penal-compensatory test of deductibility in the case of
payments imposed in ordinary civil suits. That is, a payment of
punitive damages should not be deductible as a business expense.
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code2 allows deductions for
all ordinary and necessary business expenses.' These deductions have
1. "Penal" as used in this Comment refers to any payment, whether criminal or
civil, imposed to punish or deter (or punish and deter) a wrongdoer. See infra notes 8-9,
and note 73 and accompanying text.
2. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1982). The Internal Revenue Code [hereinafter Code] is
codified at 26 U.S.C.
3. An expense is "ordinary" if it is "normal, usual, and customary" in the par-
ticular industry. Lilly v. Commissioner, 343 U.S. 90, 93 (1952). "Ordinary" is also used
to distinguish noncapital deductible expenses from capital expenditures, which are not
deductible under section 162. See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 689-90 (1966).
An expense is "necessary" if it is appropriate and helpful to the development of the
business. Welch v. Commissioner, 290 U.S. 111, 113 (1933).
been allowed for all businesses since 1918.1 Notwithstanding this
seemingly broad language, early in the history of the'modern income
tax, courts created a public policy doctrine by denying deductions for
expenses if their allowance would frustrate public policy.5 More than
forty years after courts created this public policy doctrine, Congress
attempted to codify it.6 The Internal Revenue Service has inter-
preted the codified doctrine to allow deductions for punitive
damages.7
This Comment first reviews the use of the public policy doctrine to
deny deductions for fines8 and penalties.9 Then it reviews the allow-
ance of deductions for compensatory payments imposed both in ordi-
nary civil suits, and for statutory violations. Next, this Comment ex-
amines congressional codification of the public policy doctrine in
1969, and it examines Revenue Ruling 80-211,1° in which the Ser-
vice interpreted the Code to allow a deduction for punitive damages
as an ordinary and necessary business expense.
By allowing a deduction for punitive damages, yet denying a de-
duction for fines and penalties, Congress has codified an inconsis-
tency that would not have arisen under the pre-codified public policy
In the case of an individual, deductions are allowed for all ordinary and necessary
expenses paid or incurred "for the production or collection of income; . . . for the man-
agement, conservation, or maintenance of property held for the production of income;
. or in connection with the determination, collection, or refund of any tax." I.R.C. §
212 (1982). Because the public policy considerations relevant to deductions under section
162 are also relevanat to section 212, see Treas. Reg. § 1.212-1(p) (as amended in 1975),
this Comment's analysis under section 162 should be understood to apply to section 212
as well.
4. See 6 J. MERTENS, THE LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 25.01, at 5, 7
n.l (1988).
5. See generally Taggart, Fines, Penalties, Bribes, and Damage Payments and
Recoveries, 25 TAX L. REv. 611 (1970); Gordon, The Public Policy Limitation on De-
ductions From Gross Income: A Conceptual Analysis, 43 IND. L.J. 406 (1968); Dia-
mond, The Relevance (or Irrelevance) of Public Policy in Disallowance of Income Tax
Deductions, 44 TAXES 803 (1966); Tyler, Disallowance of Deductions on Public Policy
Grounds, 20 TAX L. REv. 665 (1965); Lamont, Controversial Aspects of Ordinary and
Necessary Business Expenses, 42 TAXES 808, 819-35 (1964); Lindsay, Tax Deductions
and Public Policy, 41 TAXES 711 (1963).
6. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 902, 83 Stat. 487, 710-11(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 162 (1982)).
7. Rev. Rul. 80-211, 1980-2 C.B. 57.
8. "Fines," as used in this Comment, refers to criminal payments imposed to
punish or deter (or punish and deter) statutory violations. See Middle AtI. Distrib. v.
Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1136, 1143 (1979); 36A C.J.S. Fines § 1 (1961).
9. "Penalties," used in a restrictive sense in this Comment, refers to civil pay-
ments imposed to punish or deter (or punish and deter) statutory violations. See Middle
Atil., 72 T.C. at 1143; Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C. 497, 651-52(1980); 70 C.J.S. Penalties § 2 (1987).
10. 1980-2 C.B. 57. Revenue Rulings are interpretive pronouncements issued by
the Service in important instances. They are binding on the Service, and generally arise
as a result of requests for advice by taxpayers or by regional or district internal revenue
offices. HARVARD LAW SCHOOL INT'L PROGRAM IN TAXATION, TAXATION IN THE
UNITED STATES 1267-68 (1963).
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doctrine. The Comment examines this inconsistency, and suggests
that Congress may be willing to correct it. The Comment also chal-
lenges arguments favoring the deductibility of punitive damages, and
examines implications of the nondeductibility of punitive damages.
This Comment concludes that to correct the inconsistency created by
Congress, and to preserve state sovereignty, Congress should deny a
deduction, as an ordinary and necessary business expense, for puni-
tive damages.
II. DEDUCTION FOR PENAL PAYMENTS FRUSTRATES PUBLIC
POLICY
A. Lower Court Decisions
Though neither the Code nor its regulations referred to a public
policy test of deductibility," during the 1940s and 1950s, courts fre-
quently invoked public policy to deny deductions for bribes, kick-
backs, and other illegal or immoral payments. 2 Courts also denied
deductions for fines and penalties. The earliest cases addressing the
deductibility of fines and penalties were Appeal of Columbus Bread
Co."3 and Great Northern Railway Co. v. Commissioner.4 In Co-
lumbus Bread, the taxpayer attempted to deduct the payment of a
fine and a penalty imposed as a result of the taxpayer's guilty plea in
state antitrust proceedings. 5 In Great Northern, the taxpayer at-
tempted to deduct the payment of fines imposed for violations of va-
rious federal statutes.' In both cases, the Board of Tax Appeals de-
nied the deductions, but stated only that the payments were not
ordinary and necessary business expenses.'7 However, the Board
cited Appeal of Backer 8 as authority for denying the deductions.' 9
Backer was the earliest case to deny a deduction for a business
expense if its allowance would contravene public policy.2" In Backer,
11. Diamond, supra note 5, at 806.
12. See Keesling, Illegal Transactions and the Income Tax, 5 UCLA L. REV. 26,
33-34 (1958); Lurie, Deductibility of 'Illegal" Expenses, II N.Y.U. INST. ON FED.
TAX'N 1189 (1953); Note, Public Policy and Federal Income Tax Deductions, 51
COLUM. L. REV. 752, 755-61 (1951).
13. 4 B.T.A. 1126 (1926).
14. 8 B.T.A. 225 (1927), petition dismissed, 40 F.2d 372 (8th Cir.), cert. denied,
282 U.S. 855 (1930).
15. Columbus Bread, 4 B.T.A. at 1127.
16. Great Northern, 8 B.T.A. at 263.
17. Columbus Bread, 4 B.T.A. at 1128; Great Northern, 8 B.T.A. at 264-65.
18. 1 B.T.A. 214 (1924).
19. Columbus Bread, 4 B.T.A. at 1128; Great Northern, 8 B.T.A. at 265.
20. See Diamond, supra note 5, at 806. The concept of a public policy limitation
the taxpayer attempted to deduct attorney fees and other expenses
incurred while successfully defending against a prosecution for per-
jury."' The Board of Tax Appeals stated:
We do not believe that it is in the interest of sound public policy that the
commission of illegal acts should be so far protected or recognized that
their cost is regarded as a legitimate and proper deduction in the computa-
tion of net income under the revenue laws of the United States.2
Thus, the Board in Backer explicitly invoked public policy to deny
the taxpayer's claimed deduction. Although the Board was not so
explicit in Columbus Bread and Great Northern, the Board's citing
of Backer as authority for denying the deductions in those cases indi-
cates that the Board held that public policy proscribed deductions
for fines and penalties. In the appeal of the Board's Great Northern
decision, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals revealed the essence of
the public policy doctrine when it stated: "It cannot be that Con-
gress intended the ...[taxpayer] should have any advantage, di-
rectly or indirectly, or any reduction, directly or indirectly, of these
penalties."23 After Columbus Bread and Great Northern, lower
courts continued to apply the public policy doctrine to deny deduc-
tions for fines and penalties, as well as for payments in compromise
of potential liability for fines and penalties.24
B. The Supreme Court: Tank Truck Rentals
The Supreme Court considered the public policy doctrine sur-
rounding the deductibility of fines and penalities in Tank Truck
Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner.25 In Tank Truck, a corporate tax-
payer attempted to deduct the payment of fines imposed on it for
on business deductions appeared in England before appearing in the United States. See
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Alexander von Glehn & Co., 2 K.B. 553 (1920);
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Warnes & Co., 2 K.B. 444 (1919).
21. Backer, I B.T.A. at 215.
22. Id. at 217. The Supreme Court later overruled the result (but not the public
policy doctrine) of Backer. See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966) (holding
that a deduction for legal fees, even when incurred in an unsuccessful criminal defense,
does not frustrate public policy).
23. Great N. Ry. v. Commissioner, 40 F.2d 372, 373 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 282
U.S. 855 (1930).
24. See, e.g., Lentin v. Commissioner, 226 F.2d 695 (7th Cir. 1955) (penalty for
violation of federal price control statute), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 934 (1956); Commis-
sioner v. Longhorn Portland Cement Co., 148 F.2d 276 (5th Cir.) (settlement of poten-
tial liability for penalties for violations of state antitrust laws), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 728(1945); Burroughs Bldg. Material Co. v. Commissioner, 47 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1931)(fines for violations of state price fixing statute); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry. v. Commis-
sioner, 47 F.2d 990 (7th Cir.) (penalties for violations of various federal statutes), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 618 (1931); Davenshire, Inc. v. Commissioner, 12 T.C. 958 (1949)(settlement of potential liability for penalties for violations of federal child labor statute);
Wiedetz v. Commissioner, 2 T.C. 1262 (1943) (payment of fine without prosecution).
25. 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
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operating its trucks in violation of state maximum weight laws.26
The Court stated that Congress, in allowing various deductions,
could not have intended to frustrate declared state policy.27 The
Court held that although the nondeductibility of an expense always
depends on "the severity and immediacy of the frustration resulting
from allowance of the deduction, ' 28 a deduction for fines and penal-
ties would severely frustrate state policy by reducing the "sting" of
the imposed payment, and by encouraging further violations of state
law.29
Some commentators, critical of the Supreme Court's reasoning in
Tank Truck, have argued that allowing a deduction for a penal pay-
ment does not reduce its "sting" or impact, but rather, disallowance
of a deduction for a penal payment increases its impact beyond the
expectations of the governmental authority imposing it.30 But this
argument relies on the existence of an unexpressed intent on the part
of the authority imposing the penal payment. For a taxpayer having
a twenty-eight percent marginal tax rate, a deductible $10,000 fine
26. Id. at 31.
27. Id. at 35.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 35-36. The Court also noted that allowing deductions even for inno-
cently incurred fines would frustrate state policy, unless the statute distinguished between
innocent and willful violations. Id. at 36. The Court so held in a companion case to Tank
Truck, Hoover Motor Express Co. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 38 (1958).
Some authority appeared to assert that penal payments could be deductible. See Jerry
Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949). In Rossman, the tax-
payer attempted to deduct a payment imposed for violations of a federal price control
act. Id. at 711. Though the court denied that the payments were penal, id. at 712, it
stated: "[Tihere are 'penalties' and 'penalties,' and some are deductible and some are
not." Id. at 713. Notwithstanding this invitation for courts to allow deductions for some
penalties, no other court applied Rossman to allow a deduction for a penalty in any
context other than where the taxpayer had violated the price control statute.
The Rossman court cited no authority for allowing a deduction for a penal payment.
Indeed, the Supreme Court noted that the courts had uniformly denied deductions for
penal payments. See Tank Truck, 356 U.S. at 35-36. Also, the Supreme Court mini-
mized Rossman by explaining that the deduction in Rossman was proper because the
price control statute itself distinguished between willful and innocent violations, and
Rossman Corp. was an innocent violator. See id. at 37.
Apparently, the Court's explanation of Rossman was not wholly convincing. In Marks
v. Commissioner, 27 T.C. 464 (1956), the court, citing Rossman, refused to classify a
payment in settlement of potential liability for a violation of the Securities Exchange Act
as either penal or nonpenal, and allowed a deduction. Id. at 468-69. However, the pay-
ment represented only the actual profit that the taxpayer had wrongfully realized. See id.
at 465, 467. Thus, the payment was nonpenal and properly deductible. See infra notes
42-46 and accompanying text.
30. See Diamond, supra note 5, at 821; Tyler, supra note 5, at 667-68; Note,
Business Expenses, Disallowance, and Public Policy: Some Problems of Sanctioning
with the Internal Revenue Code, 72 YALE L.J. 108, 117 (1962).
would decrease the taxpayer's net wealth by $7,200, while the same
fine, if nondeductible, would decrease the taxpayer's net wealth by
the full $10,000. Accordingly, the increased impact argument asserts
that when a governmental authority imposes a $10,000 fine on a tax-
payer having a twenty-eight percent marginal tax rate, it really in-
tends to decrease the taxpayer's net wealth by only $7,200. If the
governmental authority imposed on the taxpayer a thirty day jail
term instead of a $10,000 fine, no one would question whether the
authority intended that the taxpayer spend thirty days in confine-
ment. Why then, should one question whether an authority imposing
a $10,000 fine intends to decrease the taxpayer's net wealth by any
amount other than $10,000?31
Notwithstanding the decision in Tank Truck, the Supreme Court
has not always been thoroughly deferential to state interests when
interpreting federal tax law. In Commissioner v. Sullivan,32 decided
the same day as Tank Truck, the taxpayer attempted to deduct rent
and wage expenses incurred in operating a gambling business. 3 A
state statute had declared that not only was the operation of such a
business illegal, but the mere payment of the rent expenses for such
a business was also illegal.34 The Tax Court denied the deductions,
since the expenses were connected with illegal acts,3 5 but the Su-
preme Court allowed the deductions.36 The Court distinguished
Tank Truck on the grounds that unlike the taxpayer in that case,
the taxpayer in Sullivan was not attempting to avoid the conse-
quences of violations of the law.37
This distinction is sound in that the expenses incurred by the tax-
payer in Sullivan, though part of or connected with a prohibited act,
were not incurred as punishment imposed by the state for engaging
in the act. Thus, a federal tax deduction for the expenses did not
reduce a state imposed punishment. Nevertheless, the deduction
31. The argument asserting an increased impact from a denial of a deduction
may have emanated from Commissioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943). See Tyler,
supra note 5, at 667. In Heininger, the Court held that a denial of a deduction for legal
expenses incurred in attempting to enjoin a postal fraud order would "attach a serious
punitive consequence" to the Postmaster's finding of guilt, which Congress had not in-
tended. 320 U.S. at 474-75. The Court was not asserting that a denial of a deduction for
legal fees would increase the impact of a penalty, but was asserting that a denial of a
deduction would create a penalty, since the postal statute did not intend to punish the
taxpayer for hiring counsel. See id. at 474. The Court's holding should not be construed
to assert that if a government does intend to punish and imposes a $10,000 fine, then the
impact of the fine is increased if the taxpayer's net wealth is decreased by the full
$10,000.
32. 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
33. Id. at 27.
34. Id. at 28.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 29.
37. Id.
[VOL. 26: 357, 19891 Punitive Damages Deductibility
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW
makes the relative cost of engaging in the illegal activity less than it
would be without the deduction, resulting in apparent federal ap-
proval of the illegal activity. That the Supreme Court ignored this
apparent approval of illegal activity indicates that the Court was re-
luctant, in the absence of statutory authority, to use federal tax law
to promote nontax policies, even when legitimate state concerns are
thereby subordinated.3 8
III. DEDUCTION FOR COMPENSATORY PAYMENTS FRUSTRATES No
PUBLIC POLICY
A. Ordinary Civil Suits
Though courts denied deductions for penal payments imposed for
statutory violations, they allowed deductions for compensatory pay-
ments imposed in ordinary civil suits. An early case that distin-
guished these two classes of payments was Helvering v. Hampton.39
In Hampton, the taxpayer attempted to deduct a payment made in
settling a judgment against him for fraudulent procurement of a
lease.4 ° The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals allowed the deduction,
and distinguished the public policy cases that denied deductions for
fines, stating that there was "no analogy" between the payment of a
fine for a public offense and the payment of restitution for tortious
conduct.4' Essentially, allowing a deduction for compensatory pay-
38. Compare the decision in Sullivan with I.R.C. § 280E (1982) (denying all
business expense deductions for enterprises trafficking in illegal drugs).
39. 79 F.2d 358 (9th Cir. 1935).
40. Id. at 358.
41. See id. at 359. For additional cases allowing business expense deductions for
payments of compensatory settlements and judgments, see James E. Caldwell & Co. v.
Commissioner, 234 F.2d 660 (6th Cir. 1956) (judgment for fraud and conspiracy), rev'g,
24 T.C. 597 (1955); Anderson v. Commissioner, 81 F.2d 457 (10th Cir. 1936) (compro-
mise of judgment for negligence in operation of an automobile while on a business trip);
Ostrom v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 608 (1981) (judgment for fraud); Vanderbilt v. Com-
missioner, 16 T.C.M. (CCH) 1081 (1957) (libel judgment); Camloc Fastener Co. v.
Commissioner, 10 T.C. 1024 (1948) (settlement of action for breach of contract); Great
Is. Holding Corp. v. Commissioner, 5 T.C. 150 (1945) (settlement of claim for misman-
agement of a corporation); International Shoe Co. v. Commissioner, 38 B.T.A. 81 (1938)
(settlement of action for wrongful interference with a business); Howard v. Commis-
sioner, 22 B.T.A. 375 (1931) (settlement of action for misrepresentation and conspiracy);
cf. Becker Bros. v. United States, 7 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1925) (judgment for patent infringe-
ment deductible as a 'loss); Appeal of Producers Fuel Co., 1 B.T.A. 202 (1924) (settle-
ment for breach of contract deductible as a loss); Donaghey Real Estate & Constr. Co. v.
Commissioner, 5 B.T.A. 766 (1926) (holding that if the taxpayer had actually paid dam-
ages in settlement of a wrongful death suit, a loss deduction would certainly be allowed).
But see O'Brien v. Commissioner, 36 T.C. 957 (1961) (attempting to deny, on public
policy grounds, a deduction for any part of a judgment paid to an insurance company
ments incurred in ordinary civil suits frustrated no public policy.
B. Statutory Violations
Interestingly, the courts also allowed deductions for compensatory
payments imposed for statutory violations. In Grossman & Sons,
Inc. v. Commissioner,42 the taxpayer attempted to deduct a payment
made to the United States in settlement of the government's suit
alleging that the taxpayer had violated the False Claims Act.43 Since
the government had sought double damages and $2,000 for each of
100 fraudulent claims submitted by the taxpayer,44 the taxpayer's
settlement appeared penal in nature. But the Tax Court held that
the ultimate settlement payment was compensatory rather than pe-
nal, because it represented only the actual damages suffered by the
government. 45 Thus, the court allowed the deduction. 46 Apparently,
allowing a deduction for a statutorily imposed compensatory pay-
ment frustrated no public policy, just as allowing a deduction for
compensatory payments imposed in ordinary civil suits frustrated no
public policy.' 7 These results are consistent with the purpose of com-
pursuant to a civil suit (in contract) for fraud, where the taxpayer had also been con-
victed in criminal proceedings), affd on other grounds, 321 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1963)
(pointing out that the Commissioner had already allowed a deduction for the amount
actually paid toward the judgment, and there is no need to consider public policy on the
question of allowing a deduction for the amount not paid); Anchor Coupling Co. v.
United States, 427 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1970) (payment to settle suit for specific perform-
ance of contract to purchase corporate assets held nondeductible capital expenditure,
pursuant to I.R.C. § 263), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 908 (1971).
42. 48 T.C. 15 (1967).
43. Id. at 25.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 28-29.
46. Id. at 34.
47. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text. For other authority allowing
deductions for compensatory payments incurred for statutory violations, see Commis-
sioner v. Pacific Mills, 207 F.2d 177 (1st Cir. 1953) (payment in settlement of potential
liability for price control violations held nonpenal, thus deductible, since it was calculated
to only remove taxpayer's wrongful profit); Milner Enterprises v. Commissioner, 65-2
USTC (CCH) 1 9612 (S.D. Miss. July 28, 1965) (payment in settlement of suit by
United States under Surplus Property Act); I.T. 3762, 1945 C.B. 95 (allowing deduction
for payment of award to employees under Fair Labor Standards Act); see also I.T. 3627,
1943 C.B. Ill (holding that amounts paid to government by judgment or settlement for
violations of Emergency Price Control Act are penal, hence nondeductible; but amounts
paid by judgment or settlement to consumers under the Act are compensatory, hence
deductible).
But cf. Faulk v. Commissioner, 26 T.C. 948 (1956). In Faulk, the taxpayer attempted
to deduct all or one-half of the double damages it paid to the government for violation of
the False Claims Act. Id. at 948. The Tax Court held that it was irrevelant whether any
of the payment was compensatory, because public policy prohibits a deduction where the
taxpayer commits fraud against the government. Id. at 951. But the Tax Court repudi-
ated Faulk in Grossman, 48 T.C. at 31-32, favoring the distinction between compensa-
tory and penal payments. Id. at 33. Applying Grossman to the facts in Faulk, the court
should have allowed a deduction for one-half of the double damages, since this amount
would represent the actual (compensatory) damages suffered by the government. See
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pensatory payments, since, unlike penal payments, which are im-
posed to punish or deter (or punish and deter) wrongful conduct,48
compensatory payments are imposed only to make an injured party
whole.49 Thus, no public policy is frustrated if the taxpayer lessens
the impact of a compensatory payment with a deduction, as long as
the injured party receives payment.
As of 1969, the judiciary had appended the following test of de-
ductibility to the ordinary and necessary test of deductibility pro-
vided by section 162 of the Code:
(1) If a statutory payment was penal, it was not deductible;
(2) If a statutory payment was compensatory, it was deductible;
(3) If a payment imposed in an ordinary civil suit was compensa-
tory, it was deductible.
IV. CONGRESS REGAINS CONTROL OF SECTION 162 DEDUCTIONS
A. The Tax Reform Act of 1969
Before 1969, the Code provided no general public policy test of
deductibility for ordinary and necessary business expenses, 50 al-
though the judiciary had firmly established such a test.51 In 1969,
Congress ended its silence on the public policy doctrine and passed
the Tax Reform Act of 1969.52 A portion of the Act amended sec-
tion 162 to provide that no deduction shall be allowed, as an ordi-
nary and necessary expense, for "any fine or similar penalty paid to
a government for the violation of any law. ''53 Though the legislative
history of the Act is ambiguous,54 Congress intended to recognize
supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text.
48. See supra note 1.
49. 22 Am. JUR. 2D Damages § 27 (1988).
50. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 273 [hereinafter Report], reprinted in
1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2027, 2310.
51. See Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958); see also
cases cited supra note 24.
52. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 902, 83 Stat. 487, 710-11
(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 162 (1982)).
53. Id. § 902(a), 83 Stat. at 710 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 162(f) (1982)).
54. The ambiguity stems from a congressional intent to codify the then-existingjudicial position on the deductibility of penal payments, see Report, supra note 50, at
274, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 2312, while apparently
limiting nondeductibility to criminal fines. Id. at 274, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS at 2311-12. But the then-existing judicial rule clearly denied
deductions for civil penalties. Adolf Meller Co. v. Commissioner, 600 F.2d 1360, 1362
(Ct. Cl. 1979); see, e.g., Appeal of Columbus Bread Co., 4 B.T.A. 1126 (1926). The
ambiguity was later resolved. See Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Commissioner, 75 T.C.
497, 652 (1980) (Congress codified the preexisting judicial rule); S. REP. No. 437, 92d
the then-existing penal-compensatory test of deductibility for statu-
torily imposed payments. 55 Thus, a statutorily imposed payment is a
nondeductible "fine or similar penalty" if it is penal (meant to pun-
ish or deter, or both), but if the statutory payment is only compensa-
tory, it is deductible.16
With the Tax Reform Act of 1969, Congress did more than just
recognize the penal-compensatory test of deductibility for statutory
payments. Congress intended to completely codify the circumstances
under which public policy requires a denial of a deduction under sec-
tion 162. Besides prohibiting a deduction for fines and similar penali-
ties, 57 Congress denied a deduction for the penalty portion of treble
damage payments for antitrust violations, 8 and denied deductions
for various bribes and kickbacks.59 The senate report accompanying
these amendments to section 162 states: "The provision for the de-
nial of the deductions for payments in these situations which are
deemed to violate public policy is intended to be all inclusive."' 0 The
Treasury regulation accompanying section 162 is consistent with this
statement of congressional intent: "A deduction for an expense paid
or incurred after December 30, 1969, which would otherwise be al-
lowable under section 162 [as an ordinary and necessary expense]
shall not be denied on the ground that allowance of such deduction
would frustrate a sharply defined public policy."6 1 In addition, in
Raymond Bertolini Trucking Co. v. Commissioner,6 2 the Sixth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals stated that amended section 162 and its Trea-
sury regulation do in fact require that the Commissioner base deni-
als of deductions for business expenses only on the amended
Cong., 1st Sess. 73-74, reprinted in 1971 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1918, 1980(disclaiming any congressional intent to limit nondeductibility to only criminal fines);
Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(b)(iii) (as amended in 1975) (civil penalties are not deductible).
55. See Southern Pacific, 75 T.C. at 652.
56. See Middle AtI. Distrib., Inc. v. Commissioner, 72 T.C. 1136 (1979); Huff v.
Commissioner, 80 T.C. 804, 824 (1983); Southern Pacific, 75 T.C. at 652; cf. Grossman
& Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C. 15 (1967) (pre-1969 case, discussed supra text
accompanying notes 42-46). Compare Treas. Reg. § 1.162-21(2) (as amended in 1975)(compensatory damages paid to a government do not constitute a fine or similar penalty)
with Standard Oil Co. v. Commissioner, 129 F.2d 363 (7th Cir. 1942) (compensatory
damages for fraud against the United States not deductible), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 688
(1942). But see Waldman v. Commissioner, 850 F.2d 611 (9th Cir. 1988), af'g 88 T.C.
1384 (1987) (restitution paid to victims, pursuant to conviction for conspiracy, consti-
tutes a "fine or similar penalty paid to a government").
57. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
58. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 902(a), 83 Stat. 487, 710(codified as amended at I.R.C. § 162(g) (1982)).
59. Id. § 902(b), 83 Stat. at 710 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 162(c)(l)-(2)
(1982)).
60. Report, supra note 50, at 274, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS at 2311.
61. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (as amended in 1988) (relevant portion amended by
T.D. 7345, 1975-1 C.B. 51).
62. 736 F.2d 1120 (6th Cir. 1984).
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language of section 162,63 and not on public policy grounds." '
It thus seems that Congress, in codifying its concept of the public
policy doctrine, has preempted the judicial version of the doctrine.
This preemption may have an undesirable effect. A business expense
deduction that would be properly disallowed under the pre-codified
public policy doctrine, as frustrating public policy, would be allowed
under the codified doctrine unless specifically proscribed by section
162 as amended. This problem arises with the deductibility of puni-
tive damages. 5
63. In broad terms, the general subsection and portions of section 162 relating to
public policy provide:
(1) In general - A deduction is allowed for ordinary and necessary expenses paid or
incurred in carrying on any trade or business, including amounts for salaries and other
compensation, traveling expenses, and rentals or other payments required for possession
of property not owned by the taxpayer. I.R.C. § 162(a) (1982).
(2) A deduction is not allowed as an ordinary and necessary expense for any illegal
bribe or kickback paid to a government entity or employee, nor for any payment unlaw-
ful under the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977. I.R.C. § 162(c)(1).
(3) No deduction is allowed as an ordinary and necessary expense for any bribe or
kickback that is illegal under federal law or illegal under a state law that is generally
enforced, and where the law subjects the payor to a criminal penalty or the loss of the
privilege to engage in a trade or business. I.R.C. § 162(c)(2).
(4) No deduction is allowed as an ordinary and necessary expense for the payment of
any kickback, rebate, or bribe made by one who furnishes items or services paid for
under the Social Security Act, if the payment is made pursuant to the furnishing of those
items or services. (Payments for referrals of customers are included.) I.R.C. § 162(c) (3).
(5) No deduction is allowed as an ordinary and necessary expense for any fine or
similar penalty paid to a government for the violation of any law. I.R.C. § 162(f).
(6) No deduction is allowed as an ordinary and necessary expense for two-thirds of
any amount paid as damages by judgment or settlement under section 4 of the Clayton
Act for antitrust violations. This provision applies only where the taxpayer was also crim-
inally convicted for, or plead guilty or nolo contendere to, antitrust violations. I.R.C. §
162(g).
64. See Raymond, 736 F.2d at 1122. For an argument against such a conclusion,
see Note, The Judicial Public Policy Doctrine in Tax Litigation, 74 MIcH. L. REV. 131
(1975).
Interestingly, courts and the Commissioner may still invoke public policy to deny loss
deductions under I.R.C. § 165 (1982). See Farris v. Commissioner, 823 F.2d 1552 (9th
Cir. 1987), affg without opinion 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 412 (1985); Holt v. Commissioner,
611 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1980), affg per curiam 69 T.C. 75 (1977); Lincoln v. Commis-
sioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 185 (1985); cf. Treas. Reg. § 1.165-7(a)(3)(i) (as amended in
1977) (denying casualty loss deduction for damage to taxpayer's automobile if caused by
taxpayer's willful act or willful negligence). But see Mazzei v. Commissioner, 61 T.C.
497, 506 (1974) (Sterrett, J., dissenting) ("[C]ongressional intent could logically be read
to remove public policy considerations from the Internal Revenue Code where not specifi-
cally included . . . ."); Medeiros v. Commissioner, 77 T.C. 1255, 1262 n.8 (1981)
("There is some question whether the public policy doctrine retains any vitality since the
enactment of sec[tion] 162(0.").
65. This problem has apparently also occurred where a taxpayer was allowed a
deduction for expenses incurred for advertisements that violated the Civil Rights Act of
1964. See Rev. Rul. 74-323, 1974-2 C.B. 40. But see Note, The Judicial Public Policy
B. Amended Code Permits Deduction for Punitive Damages
The deductibility of punitive damages has never been directly liti-
gated.6" But in 1980, the Service issued Revenue Ruling 80-211,67
holding that punitive damages are deductible as an ordinary and
necessary business expense. In this ruling, a corporate taxpayer de-
sired to deduct a judgment against it for punitive damages for fraud
and breach of contract.68 The Service concluded that with the Tax
Reform Act of 1969,69 Congress intended to preempt the pre-codi-
fled public policy doctrine. 0 Since amended section 162 does not
specifically proscribe a deduction for punitive damages, the Service
held that punitive damages are deductible. 1 Because the Service
based its decision on statutory construction and congressional intent,
and not on the taxpayer's specific conduct, there is every reason to
believe that all punitive damages are deductible, regardless of the
circumstances under which they are imposed.
Following congressional amendment of section 162 and the Ser-
vice's interpretation of that amendment, the following test of deduct-
ibility has applied to business expenses that are otherwise ordinary
and necessary:
(1) If a statutory payment is penal, it is not deductible;
(2) If a statutory payment is compensatory, it is deductible;
(3) If a payment is incurred in an ordinary civil suit, it is deducti-
ble regardless of whether it is penal or compensatory.
V. CONGRESSIONAL INCONSISTENCY
Because the Service correctly determined that congressional fail-
ure in 1969 to prohibit a deduction for punitive damages mandates
that such a deduction be allowed,7 2 Congress has codified an incon-
sistency. The purpose of punitive damages is to punish the wrong-
Doctrine in Tax Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 131 (1975) (arguing against the Service's
position in Revenue Ruling 74-323, on the grounds that the pre-codified public policy
doctrine has not been preempted).
66. But the question was indirectly raised in International Shoe Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 38 B.T.A. 81 (1938), where the taxpayer attempted to deduct a payment in set-
tlement of a suit against it for interfering with another business. Id. at 88, 95. The suit
included a claim for punitive damages. Id. at 88. The court allowed the deduction, id. at
97, but the settlement amounted to less than the claimed actual (nonpunitive) damages.
See id. at 88, 95. Thus, it should not be inferred that the deduction represented a deduc-
tion for punitive damages.
67. 1980-2 C.B. 57. This ruling was consistent with the Service's position in Priv.
Ltr. Rul. 79-23-006 (1979), but inconsistent with its position in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-16-021
(1978).
68. 1980-2 C.B. at 57.
69. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
70. See 1980-2 C.B. at 57; see also supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
71. 1980-2 C.B. at 57-58; see also supra note 63 (language of section 162).
72. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
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doer for improper conduct, and to deter the wrongdoer and others
from engaging in similar conduct in the future.73 But fines and pen-
alties serve substantially this same purpose. 4 In fact, punitive dam-
ages are merely fines imposed in private civil suits.7 15 Thus, allowing
a deduction for punitive damages reduces their "sting" and their de-
terrent effect in the same way that allowing a deduction for fines and
penalties would.76 An inconsistency therefore arises in allowing a de-
duction for punitive damages while denying a deduction for fines and
penalties.7 7 Congress probably did not intend to codify this inconsis-
tency, especially since Congress acknowledges that punishment and
deterrence are diluted, and public policy frustrated, whenever a pe-
nal payment is deducted.78
A. Punitive Damages Under the Precodified Public Policy
Doctrine
This inconsistency of allowing a deduction for punitive damages
while denying a deduction for fines and penalties did not arise under
the pre-codified public policy doctrine, because the deductibility of
punitive damages was never litigated under the doctrine.7 9 But if the
deductibility of punitive damages had been litigated under the pre-
codified doctrine, this inconsistency would not have arisen, because
the rationale behind the doctrine would deny a deduction for puni-
tive damages. The Supreme Court best circumscribed the pre-codi-
fled public policy doctrine in four cases: Commissioner v. Hein-
inger,80 Lilly v. Commissioner,8 Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v.
73. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON
THE LAW OF TORTS 9 (5th ed. 1984); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1)
(1979); 25 C.J.S. Damages § 117(1) (1966).
74. See supra notes 8-9.
75. International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Foust, 442 U.S. 42, 48 (1979).
76. See Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
77. The Service implicitly agreed with this conclusion in Priv. Ltr. Rul. 78-16-
021 (1978). In this ruling, a professional corporation sought to deduct payments of mal-
practice judgments and settlements on behalf of the corporation's member physicians.
The Service held that the corporation could deduct the payments only to the extent that
they compensate plaintiffs. Penalties and punitive damages would be nondeductible.
Thus, the Service equated penalties with punitive damages. The Service later reversed its
position when it conceded that it could base denials of business expense deductions only
on the language of section 162. See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text; see also
Priv. Ltr. Rul. 79-23-006 (1979).
78. See Report, supra note 50, at 273-74, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2311.
79. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
80. 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
81. 343 U.S. 90 (1952).
Commissioner,82 and Commissioner v. Tellier.8 3 These cases nar-
rowed and applied the test of nondeductibility under the public pol-
icy doctrine. A deduction would be denied for an otherwise ordinary
and necessary business expense only if its allowance would "frustrate
sharply defined national or state policies proscribing particular types
of conduct, evidenced by some governmental declaration thereof."' 4
In Heininger, the taxpayer attempted to deduct legal fees incurred
in enjoining enforcement of a mail fraud order issued by the Post-
master General.85 The Court held that a deduction would frustrate
no public policy because the statutes under which the Postmaster
issued the order declared no policy proscribing employment of coun-
sel to enjoin the order.86 In Lilly, an optician attempted to deduct
kickbacks paid to eye doctors.87 The Court held that a deduction
would frustrate no public policy because no government had declared
a policy proscribing payment of these kickbacks. 8  In Tank Truck,
the taxpayer attempted to deduct fines imposed for operating its
trucks in violation of state maximum weight laws.8 9 The Court held
that a deduction would frustrate public policy because the state had
statutorily declared a policy of proscribing the operation of over-
loaded trucks.90 And in Tellier, the taxpayer attempted to deduct
legal fees incurred in an unsuccessful criminal defense.91 The Court
held that a deduction would frustrate no public policy because reten-
tion of counsel in criminal cases is not proscribed conduct, but
rather, it is constitutionally guaranteed.92
These decisions suggest that the Supreme Court intended to pre-
vent courts and the Commissioner from using federal tax law to de-
clare conduct to be contrary to public policy if neither federal nor
state governments had so declared. Indeed, why should tax law con-
cern itself with conduct that has concerned neither federal nor state
governments? In the case of punitive damages, the question is
whether there is any public policy involved when a state court im-
poses this private civil punishment.
82. 356 U.S. 30 (1958). See also supra notes 25-29 and accompaning text.
83. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
84. Tank Truck, 356 U.S. at 33-34. The test of nondeductibility takes substan-
tially this same form in Heininger, 320 U.S. at 473-74, Lilly, 343 U.S. at 96-97, and
Tellier, 383 U.S. at 694.
85. Heininger, 320 U.S. at 469-70.
86. See id. at 474.
87. See Lilly, 343 U.S. at 91-92.
88. See id. at 97.
89. Tank Truck, 356 U.S. at 31.
90. See id. at 34-35. The Court left open the possibility that state policy could be
declared by other than a legislature. Id. at 34 n.6. Federal policy may be declared by
other than Congress. See Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 508 (1959) (long-
standing Treasury regulation).
91. Tellier, 383 U.S. at 688.
92. Id. at 694.
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As one state supreme court justice has stated, "The general inter-
ests of society and welfare of the community, as founded in legisla-
tive enactments or their reasonable interpretation, administrative
declarations, and judicial determinations in the absence of legislative
statement, are the underpinnings of public policy doctrine.""3 Thus,
given the purpose of punitive damages to punish and deter certain
types of conduct,94 the existence of punitive damages under state law
can be viewed as a declaration by the state that certain conduct is
completely contrary to the interest of society. This is true regardless
of whether an award of punitive damages may be founded upon a
state statute or upon state common law. When a state court imposes
punitive damages then, it is applying a public policy of the state,
which is to punish and deter certain conduct. Presumably, the state
would prefer that federal tax law not frustrate state policy by dilut-
ing the punitive and deterrent effects of a punitive damage award
through allowance of a business expense deduction.9
It follows that the pre-codified public policy doctrine most likely
would have denied a deduction for punitive damages. Thus, not only
has Congress codified an inconsistency with a Code that allows a
deduction for punitive damages, but it has created an inconsistency
that did not exist before attempted codification of the public policy
doctrine. Congress should correct this inconsistency by treating pay-
ments imposed in ordinary civil suits the same as payments imposed
for statutory violations. If the payment is meant to punish or deter
wrongful conduct, then it should be nondeductible, but if it is meant
only to compensate another party, it should be deductible. Accord-
ingly, punitive damages should be nondeductible.9"
93. Brachtenbach, Public Policy in Judicial Decisions, 21 GONZ. L. REV. 1, 3
(1985/86).
94. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
95. See Tank Truck, 356 U.S. at 35.
96. This result should apply whether the payment is by judgment or settlement,
since denying a deduction for a judgment but not for a settlement would encourage the
taxpayer to "pay early and get the deduction." See S & B Restaurant v. Commissioner,
73 T.C. 1226, 1234 (1980); see also McGraw-Edison Co. v. United States, 300 F.2d 453
(Ct. Cl. 1962) (sums paid in compromise of liability take on the character of the under-
lying claimed obligation); Adolf Meller Co. v. United States, 600 F.2d 1360 (Ct. Cl.
1979) (same).
In case of settlement, only the amount of the payment exceeding the plaintiff's alleged
actual damages should be nondeductible, since, unless the parties choose to classify part
of the payment as punitive, only that amount is properly termed "punitive." Cf. Rev.
Proc. 67-33, 1967-2 C.B. 659, 661 (characterization of settlement of action for treble
damages under the Clayton Act in determining whether such damages are includible in
recipient's gross income).
B. Congress Hinted at Nondeductibility
The legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1969'7 lends sup-
port to a denial of a deduction for punitive damages. As stated
earlier,99 among the provisions of the Act was a denial of a deduc-
tion for a portion of antitrust damages. In that regard, the senate
report states:
One question which arises ... is whether deductions should be allowed for
damages paid to a private party in a cause of action in which the successful
party is entitled to damages in a greater amount than the economic loss
demonstrated by him. Under section 4 of the Clayton Act, for example, a
person injured by an antitrust violation may sue for damages and recover
three times the amount of economic loss established.100
The report then reasons that a deduction for the penalty portion of
an antitrust payment reduces the impact of the payment,101 and the
report cites Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner' 2 with ap-
proval. 103 Though the report focuses on the Clayton statutory setting,
the use of the words "for example" in the above passage, and the
absence of language limiting the reasoning to statutorily imposed
payments, suggests a congressional willingness to apply the same
reasoning to deny a deduction for the punitive portion of a payment
to a private party imposed in a nonstatutory setting. That is, Con-
gress seems willing to deny a deduction for punitive damages.
It might be said that if Congress had believed that a deduction for
punitive damages would frustrate public policy, it would have pro-
hibited the deductibility of punitive damages. That is, with the Tax
Reform Act of 1969, Congress would have denied a deduction for all
penal payments paid to private parties, and not just for penal anti-
trust payments paid to private parties. This would seem especially
true since courts would no longer be able to invoke public policy to
deny business expense deductions unless statutory authority so pro-
vides. 104 But the legislative history of the Act indicates no congres-
sional consideration of private penal payments other than antitrust
payments.10 5 Consequently, the failure to deny a deduction for puni-
tive damage appears unintentional. This appearance is supported by
97. See supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
98. The denial of a deduction for punitive damages apparently must come from
Congress, not the courts. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
99. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
100. Report, supra note 50, at 273, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWs at 2310-11 (emphasis added).
101. Id. at 273, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. Naws at 2311.
102. 356 U.S. 30 (1958); see also supra notes 25-29 and accompanying text.
103. Report, supra note 50, at 273-74, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE & ADMIN.
NEws at 2311.
104. See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
105. See Report, supra note 50, at 273-75, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEws at 2310-13.
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considering that the deductibility of punitive damages has never
been litigated, and Revenue Ruling 80-211116 (allowing a deduction
for punitive damages) was not issued until 1980. In contrast, the de-
ductibility of an antitrust payment paid to a private party was ad-
dressed in 1964 by Revenue Ruling 64-224,107 in which the Service
permitted the deduction. This ruling drew immediate objections from
members of Congress,10" and the ruling is expressly mentioned in the
legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of 1969.109 Thus, it ap-
pears that the absence of any reason to consider the deductibility of
punitive damages provides a plausible explanation for Congress' fail-
ure to deny a deduction for those damages, even though it denied a
deduction for antitrust damages paid to private parties.
VI. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NONDEDUCTIBILITY OF PUNITIVE
DAMAGES
A, Response To Arguments Favoring A Deduction For Punitive
Damages
One commentator argues that a denial of a deduction for punitive
damages is inconsistent with the pre-codified public policy doctrine,
and inconsistent with current tax policy.110 The commentator argues
that the judicial public policy doctrine denied a deduction only for
payments imposed for criminal misconduct."' But this conclusion is
clearly contrary to substantial case law, as criminal fines and civil
penalties were nondeductible.1 2
The commentator also argues that since the Supreme Court never
mentioned punitive damages in applying the pre-codified public pol-
icy doctrine, and mentioned only fines, penalties, and illegal pay-
ments as nondeductible, punitive damages must be deductible. 13 Be-
cause the deductibility of punitive damages has never been litigated,
this silence theory of deductibility not only solicits obiter dictum
from the Court, but it expects the Court to predict future tax contro-
versies. A more plausible view of the Supreme Court's intent in cit-
106. 1980-2 C.B. 57; see notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
107. 1964-2 C.B. 52.
108. Taggart, supra note 5, at 617.
109. See Report, supra note 50, at 273, reprinted in 1969 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS at 2311.
110. See Note, The Tax Consequences of a Punitive Damages Award, 31 HAS-
TINGS L.J. 909 (1980).
111. Id. at 913.
112. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
113. See Note, supra note 110, at 913, 915-17.
ing fines, penalties, and illegal payments suggests that the Court
cited these expenditures only as previously litigated examples of pay-
ments whose deductibility would "frustrate sharply defined national
or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct, evidenced by
some governmental declaration thereof."114
The commentator argues that a court searching for a governmen-
tal declaration of public policy proscribing a specific conduct may
only look to a statute for such a declaration."x 5 Presumably then, a
common law award of punitive damages is not a proper declaration
of public policy to warrant a denial of a deduction for punitive dam-
ages. But the Supreme Court never stated that only a legislature
may declare the requisite public policy for a denial of a deduction.
Indeed, the Court expressly left this question open." 6
Finally, the commentator points out that taxpayers are entitled to
know in advance what conduct will have adverse tax consequences,
and this entitlement would be nullified by the nondeductibility of pu-
nitive damages since these damages can be imposed for an infinity of
wrongdoings.117 This argument is really a veiled attack on uncer-
tainty in state law on punitive damages. A denial of a deduction for
punitive damages simply forces wrongdoers to bear the full impact of
the punishment. Any uncertainty of consequences is created by state
law, and unless unconstitutional, state punitive damage law should
not be disturbed by the federal government.
B. The Use of Tax Laws to Promote Nontax Policies
A frequent assertion has been that tax laws are intended only to
tax net income, and are not intended to be used to promote nontax
policies." 8 It would then follow that a denial of a deduction for puni-
tive damages would violate this basic rule by promoting a state pol-
icy of punishing wrongdoers. This argument attempts to prove too
much. Regardless of whether it is improper for the judiciary to use
tax law to promote nontax policies without a statutory basis for do-
ing so, Congress currently believes that it is proper for the legislature
to promote nontax policies with tax laws. All business expense de-
ductions are disallowed for businesses trafficking in illegal drugs,'19
and of course, business expense deductions are disallowed for fines
114. See Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 694 (1966); Commissioner v.
Heininger, 320 U.S. 467, 473 (1943).
115. Note, supra note 110, at 914.
116. See supra note 90.
117. Note, supra note 110, at 920.
118. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356 U.S. 27, 29 (1958); James v. United
States, 366 U.S. 213, 230 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting); Diamond, supra note 5, at 821-
22; Paul, The Use of Public Policy by the Commissioner in Disallowing Deductions,
UNIV. OF S. CAL. TAX INST. 715, 723-31, 737-42 (1954); Note, supra note 30, at 114-15.
119. I.R.C. § 280E (1982).
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and penalties,12 ° for various bribes and kickbacks,121 as well as for
antitrust damages.122 Additionally, Congress has sat idly by while
courts and the Commissioner continue to deny loss deductions under
section 165 on public policy grounds. 2 Thus, while it is true that
more than seventy years ago, Congress expressed a policy of taxing
net income without injecting nontax considerations, 24 this policy has
been subordinated with sufficient frequency so as to transform invo-
cations of this policy as a basis for restraint in tax law into mere
conclusory statements indicating an unwillingness to use tax law for
a particular purpose.
In addition, Congress has broad constitutional powers to tax in-
come. Since adoption of the sixteenth amendment,' 25 only once has
an income tax provision been found unconstitutional.' 26 Accordingly,
there should be no barrier to denial of a deduction for punitive dam-
ages, especially in light of the nondeductibility of fines and penal-
ties. 27 In contrast, there are constitutional barriers confronting a
federal government that attempts to ignore state law and frustrate
that law with its own laws. 28 Accordingly, it may be an infringe-
ment of state sovereignty to frustrate state law by reducing state
imposed punishment through the federal tax system by allowing a
deduction for punitive damages.
C. Effect. of Nondeductibility on Lawsuit Settlements
Besides preventing frustration of state policy, a denial of a deduc-
tion for punitive damages has another practical effect. The denial
would increase the net cost to the taxpayer of a punitive damage
payment compared to the cost under current law. Since compensa-
tory payments are fully deductible, 129 they would be less costly to the
taxpayer than punitive payments. Thus, if the taxpayer believes that
a punitive award is possible, the taxpayer can afford to attempt to
120. I.R.C. § 162(0.
121. I.R.C. § 162(c)(1)-(3).
122. I.R.C. § 162(g).
123. See supra note 64.
124. 50 CoNG. REc. 3849-50 (1913); Paul, supra note 118, at 723-26.
125. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. The sixteenth amendment authorized the modern
income tax.
126. 1 J. MERTENS, supra note 4, § 4.01.
127. I.R.C. § 162(0 (1982); see also Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,
356 U.S. 30 (1958).
128. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); U.S. CONsT. amend. X. But see
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
129. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
prevent the award by offering a larger compensatory settlement ap-
proaching the plaintiff's actual damages. Since an award of punitive
damages must be supported by an underlying cause of action,"' ° if
the taxpayer believes that a punitive award is possible, then the
plaintiff likely has a valid underlying claim. The ultimate result is
that in a whole class of cases where the plaintiff has a valid underly-
ing claim, out of court settlements are more likely to occur because
settlement offers approach actual damages. These cases are precisely
the cases that most merit out of court settlement, because the courts
are best used for cases where liability is unclear.
VII. CONCLUSION
Under the pre-1969 judicial public policy doctrine, the courts ap-
plied a penal-compensatory test of deductibility to payments imposed
for statutory violations. Payments intended to punish or deter wrong-
ful conduct were nondeductible as ordinary and necessary business
expenses, while payments intended to compensate another party
were deductible as ordinary and necessary business expenses. Absent
from consideration under the judicial public policy doctrine was the
application of the penal-compensatory test of deductibility in the
case of payments imposed in ordinary civil suits. This void in federal
tax law occurred because the deductibility of punitive damages was
never directly litigated. Thus, the only application of the judicial
public policy doctrine to ordinary civil suits was where the taxpayer
sought a deduction for compensatory damages.
Congressional codification of the public policy doctrine in 1969
currently prevents courts and the Commissioner from applying the
pre-codified public policy doctrine to deny a deduction for punitive
damages, even though consistency, the pre-codified doctrine, and
preservation of states' rights all suggest nondeductibility. Because
only Congress may correct this defect in the Code, Congress should
amend the Code to deny a deduction, as an ordinary and necessary
business expense, for punitive damages.
K. TODD CURRY
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 comment c (1979).
